Self-financed efficiency incentives: case study of Mexico by Anand R. Gopal et al.
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Self-financed efficiency incentives: case study of Mexico
Anand R. Gopal & Gregory Leventis & Amol Phadke &
Stephane de la Rue du Can
Received: 22 June 2013 /Accepted: 26 March 2014 /Published online: 24 April 2014
# The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Numerous countries use public funds to sub-
sidize residential electricity for a variety of socioeconom-
ic objectives. These subsidies lower the value of energy
efficiency to the consumer while raising it for the gov-
ernment. Further, while it would be especially helpful to
have stringent Minimum Energy Performance Standards
(MEPS) for end uses in this environment, they are hard
to strengthen without imposing a cost on ratepayers. In
this second-best world, where the presence of subsidies
limits the government’s ability to strengthen standards,
we find that efficiency-induced savings in subsidy pay-
ments can be a significant source of financing for energy
efficiency incentive programs. Here, we introduce the
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL)
Energy Efficiency Revenue Analysis (LEERA) model
to estimate the greatest appliance efficiency improve-
ments that can be achieved in Mexico by the revenue
neutral financing of incentive programs from savings in
subsidy payments yielded by the same efficiency im-
provements. We analyze Mexico’s tariff structures and
the long-run marginal cost of supply to calculate the
marginal savings for the government from appliance
efficiency. We find that these avoided subsidy payments
alone can provide enough revenue to cover the full
incremental manufacturing cost of refrigerators that are
29 % more efficient and televisions that are 36 % more
efficient than baseline models. For room air conditioners
(ACs), the same source of financing can contribute up to
one third of the incremental manufacturing cost of a
model that is 10 % more efficient than baseline. We
analyze the sensitivity of our results to the most impor-
tant parameters and find our main conclusion that
efficiency-induced avoided subsidy payments will con-
tribute significantly to financing efficiency incentive
programs in Mexico to be significant and robust.
Keywords Financial incentives . Energy efficiency.
Developing countries . Energy subsidies . Appliance
market transformation .Mexico
Introduction
Electricity consumption subsidies are common in coun-
tries around the world. While subsidies are found in
OECD countries, the majority of subsidy programs are
in developing countries, including the major emerging
economies (Morgan 2008). In most of these countries,
electricity and fuel subsidies were introduced as social
programs to reduce the cost of energy for the poor
(Komives et al. 2006). Hence, reducing or eliminating
subsidies involves substantial political risk and is usu-
ally not part of the energy policy dialogue (2010).
Further, subsidies make it harder to introduce or
strengthen Minimum Energy Performance Standards
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(MEPS) for end uses, as greater stringency is frequently
not cost-effective from the consumer perspective
(Letschert et al. 2011).
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) is
developing the LBNL Energy Efficiency Revenue
Analysis (LEERA) model to help design incentive pro-
grams that meaningfully improve appliance efficiency
with self-financing from efficiency-induced savings in
subsidy payments. LEERA calculates the financial sav-
ings that will accrue to the government from the deploy-
ment of more efficient models for each type of appliance.
It then draws on the product-specific technoeconomic
analyses of the Super-efficient Equipment and Appliance
Deployment (SEAD) Initiative,1 which calculate country-
specific incremental manufacturing costs of higher effi-
ciency appliance models. These incremental costs and
government financial savings are then compared to help
incentive program designers understand the amount of
self-financing that will be available at each level of appli-
ance efficiency improvement. Where the amount of self-
financing available is greater than the program costs, an
appliance incentive program could be entirely financed by
avoided subsidy payments. Themodel can support several
types of incentive program design.
The version of LEERA we present here can most
effectively support policy in cases where revenue flows
for electricity subsidies and end-use efficiency incentive
programs are fungible, and decisions regarding funding
allocations for either option rest with the same authority
(i.e., the Government ofMexico). These conditions hold
true in a large number of developing countries because
there are no established funding mechanisms for effi-
ciency incentive programs nor too many restrictions on
sources of financing for them (Sarkar and Singh 2010).
Therefore, this version of LEERA cannot directly sup-
port incentive program design in the USA and in many
European countries where stricter policies govern the
sources of financing for energy efficiency (Geller et al.
2006), although it can still identify incentive opportuni-
ties. In future improvements to the model, we plan to
extend its applicability to cases common in the USA and
Europe where decisions to invest in efficiency are made
by privately owned utilities and their government regu-
lators (Geller et al. 2006).
In this paper, we analyze refrigerators, televisions
(TVs), and room air conditioners (ACs) for residential
use in Mexico, a sector that receives generous net
taxpayer-funded electricity subsidies (Komives et al.
2009). Our goal is to help Mexican regulators under-
stand, precisely, the extent to which they can transform
the markets for these major end-use appliances if reve-
nue from avoided subsidy payments was to be used to
finance incentive programs. The paper is structured as
follows. We first present an overview of energy subsi-
dies and the theory of their impact on demand for energy
efficiency. Next, we introduce and explain the LEERA
model. This is followed by a presentation and discussion
of results for Mexico and their implication for appliance
market transformation and financing for incentive pro-
grams. Finally, we discuss broader applications of
LEERA.
Energy subsidies and energy efficiency
Studies of global energy subsidies find that they are
substantial and most are in developing countries
(Morgan 2008). Globally, approximately $420 billion
is spent annually on energy subsidies, making it one of
the most subsidized sectors (Badcock and Lenzen 2010;
Lewis 2012). Although most of these subsidies are for
petroleum, substantial support is directed toward elec-
tricity consumption (Foster and Yepes 2006). In 2008,
the UNEP estimated that the economic value of subsi-
dies going to the electricity sectors in Russia, China,
India, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa approached or
exceeded $5 billion per year in each country (Morgan
2008). Importantly, even though the stated goals of most
subsidy programs are to reduce poverty, there is consid-
erable evidence that they are not well targeted (Komives
et al. 2006).
Despite the massive amounts spent on subsidies,
there is a paucity of data on energy subsidy programs
at the country level. Studies have lamented the lack of a
global or even OECD-wide inventory of programs
(Badcock and Lenzen 2010; Gadgil and Anjali Sastry
1994). Badcock and Lenzen undertook a comprehensive
review of subsidies for energy generation, but they did
not find a consistent definition of electricity subsidies, a
consistent method of accounting for them, or a consis-
tent method for estimating them (Badcock and Lenzen
2010). Even the European Union does not use a uniform
evaluation method for each member country (Bacon
et al. 2010). Part of the difficulty in evaluating and
analyzing subsidies is the numerous forms that subsidies
1 To learn more about the SEAD Initiative, please visit http://
superefficient.org
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can take including direct cash transfers, tax credits,
rebates, accelerated depreciation, cross subsidies, price
caps, subsidized loans, waived dividends, risk assump-
tion, or delayed system maintenance (Komives et al.
2005). Further, many countries, like India, have un-
planned subsidies where government-owned utilities
frequently recoup their losses from the general fund on
an ad hoc basis (Abhyankar and Phadke 2012).
Improving energy efficiency in subsidized regimes
From an energy policy perspective, subsidies cause
overconsumption of energy and lead to inefficient allo-
cation of societal resources (2010). From an energy
efficiency perspective, end-use electricity subsidies typ-
ically make efficiency programs more challenging to
implement (Bouton et al. 2010). Even in the absence
of subsidies, society underinvests in energy efficiency
due to market failures like first-cost barriers, consumer
information asymmetry, and environmental externalities
caused by energy production and use (Jaffe and Stavins
1994; Meier and Jollands 2007). Figure 1 shows the
deadweight loss resulting from these market failures if
electricity is priced at the privately optimal marginal
cost (PPRIV) instead of the socially optimal marginal
cost (PSOC).
Electricity subsidies further increase this deadweight
loss. Figure 2 shows a market in which the price to
consumers (PSUB) for electricity is reduced below
PPRIV due to subsidies. Electricity becomes even
cheaper compared to its socially optimal cost, resulting
in even greater demand (QSUB). However, subsidies
make energy efficiency more valuable to the govern-
ment, which can decrease its subsidy burden by reduc-
ing end-use energy consumption. From a theoretical
economic perspective, a rollback of subsidies would
be a first-choice energy policy (Komives et al. 2009).
However, as we discuss earlier, such policies have prov-
en to be politically challenging (Bacon et al. 2010). This
is because the government is not just concerned by
economic efficiency but also by political reality and
the need to maintain broad popularity. Financial incen-
tives, on the other hand, are a politically feasible effi-
ciency policy that can transform the market without any
changes to existing subsidy program design. In the next
section, we describe the methodology, assumptions,
inputs, and sources of data for the LEERA model
and explain how the model supports the design of
incentive programs self-financed by appliance effi-
ciency improvements.
The LEERA model
The objective of the LEERA model is to calculate the
savings from avoided subsidy payments achieved by
appliance energy efficiency and to treat these as reve-
nues to finance incentives for the same efficient appli-
ances. It does this by calculating the subsidy on the
marginal unit of electricity consumed by a representa-
tive appliance-owning household, multiplying that by
the annual energy savings from the deployment of a
Fig. 1 Deadweight loss due to social externalities from electricity
consumption without subsidized tariffs. MXN Mexican Pesos,
PSOC socially optimal price, PPRIV privately optimal price, QSOC
socially demanded quantity, QPRIV privately demanded quantity,
kWh kilowatt hours
Fig. 2 Additional deadweight loss due to electricity consumption
subsidies. PSUB subsidized electricity price, MCSUB marginal pri-
vate cost under subsidized pricing and demand, QSUB quantity
demanded under subsidized pricing
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more efficient appliance, and calculating the present
value of the associated subsidy payment savings over
the life of the appliance. Using this approach, we gen-
erate a curve of government financial savings for each
percentage improvement in appliance efficiency relative
to the baseline efficiency. We can compare this curve of
revenues from avoided subsidy payments to various
types of incentive program costs. In this paper, we
compare the avoided subsidy revenue curve to the in-
cremental manufacturing cost curve.
In its avoided subsidy payment calculations, LEERA
only includes subsidies that cover the difference be-
tween retail price and long-run marginal cost of gener-
ation because only this revenue is likely to be available
for financing incentive programs. LEERA does not
include efficiency-induced abatement of externalities
in the avoided subsidy calculation because these are
not real streams of revenue unless policies that regulate
for externalities already exist. Hence, it can be argued
that LEERA underestimates the overall subsidy burden
of the government, because the government will most
likely have to bear the long-run costs of social and
environmental externalities. LEERA also ignores other
forms of subsidies that are unplanned but frequent, like
grants or interest-free loans to the utility for system
upgrades, preferential tax rates to utilities, etc. Due to
their ad hoc, unplanned nature, these are hard to quantify
as efficiency-induced revenue streams available for in-
centives. However, all of these forms of subsidy pay-
ments will be reduced by improvements in appliance
efficiency, which implies that we are underestimating
the self-financing potential in our results.
First, the amount of money that the government
avoids spending for each unit of electricity saved is
calculated. This is done by calculating the difference
between the tariff at which electricity savings are real-
ized and the supply cost. LEERA assumes that appli-
ance efficiency savings occur at the consumer margin,
and hence, the model uses the following equation to
calculate avoided subsidy payment per unit of
electricity:
Avoided subsidy payment ($/kWh)=long-run mar-
ginal cost of supply (LRMC) ($/kWh)−marginal tariff
at which electricity savings occur ($/kWh).
The difference between MCSUB and PSUB in Fig. 2 is
the avoided subsidy payment calculated in the equation
above.
Next, LEERA multiplies this avoided subsidy pay-
ment per unit by the annual electricity savings from
deploying appliance models that are more efficient than
the baseline model. Baseline models are determined in
the SEAD technoeconomic analyses using market sur-
veys and forecasts for each appliance in each SEAD
country (Park et al. 2011; Shah et al. 2013). Please refer
to the Electronic supplementary material, the SEAD
technoeconomic reports, and the LBNL report in sup-
port of refrigerator MEPS revision for Mexico
(Letschert et al. 2011; Park et al. 2011; Shah et al.
2013) for more details on the baseline models we use
in our analysis. LEERA then takes the present value of
these annual financial savings over the life of the appli-
ance to get the full value, to the government, of avoided
subsidy payments at each level of improved efficiency.
These subsidy savings are then compared to the incre-
mental manufacturing costs of more efficient appliance
models. It is important to note that incremental
manufacturing costs of higher efficiency appliances tend
to drop over time as demand grows (Dale et al. 2009).
Hence, the self-financed efficiency improvement poten-
tial could be greater than we estimated in this paper.
We also correct for rebound using estimates from
literature (Davis et al. 2012; Gavankar and Geyer 2010;
Maxwell et al. 2011; Nadel 2012). We apply an 11 %
(0 % direct+11 % indirect) rebound for refrigerators and
TVs and a 24% (13% direct+11% indirect) rebound for
room ACs. Note that by including indirect rebound, we
are choosing an approach that is more conservative in
counting energy savings than many other studies
(Gavankar and Geyer 2010; Maxwell et al. 2011). This
is another factor that reduces the self-financing potential
for efficiency incentives we report in our results.
For example, a baseline refrigerator model inMexico
uses 480 kWh per year (Letschert et al. 2011). Thus,
switching to a 25 % more efficient model would yield
energy savings of 107 kWh per year.2 We calculate the
subsidy for refrigerator use by a representative house-
hold to be $0.14 per kWh, which translates to saved
subsidy payments of $13 per year. The net present value
of this revenue stream, at a real discount rate of 4 %,
over the course of the refrigerator’s 15-year lifetime is
$142. The incremental cost to produce a model that is
25 % more efficient than the baseline model is $107
(Letschert et al. 2011). Therefore, an upstream govern-
ment incentive could be set at a level that covers 100 %
2 Twenty-five percent corrected for an 11 % rebound effect results
in a 22.25 % actual savings. 480 kWh×22.25 %=106.8 kWh
saved per year.
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of the incremental cost of making a more efficient
refrigerator and still leave $35 in savings from avoided
subsidy payments as a result of deploying the more
efficient model in place of a baseline model.
In this paper, we present results for refrigerators, room
ACs (split style), and TVs.We plan to extend the analysis
to other appliances and countries, as cost curves for each
are completed by the SEAD technoeconomic analyses.
Baseline unit energy consumption (UEC) and incremen-
tal manufacturing costs for room ACs and TVs are from
the SEAD technoeconomic analysis (Park et al. 2011;
Shah et al. 2013). For refrigerators, we use data from
LBNL’s analysis in support of harmonization ofMexican
and US refrigerator standards (Letschert et al. 2011). The
discount rate we use is from the SEAD technoeconomic
analyses for each country (Shah et al. 2013).
Applying LEERA to Mexico
For this paper, we apply LEERA to the Mexican resi-
dential electricity sector. The state-owned utility,
Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), provides all
residential electricity in Mexico. Rates are set by a
complex increasing block tariff (IBT) system in which
tariff zones are defined by average regional temperature
(CFE 2012a). For electricity generation, fuel oil makes
up 18 % of the electricity generation mix and usually
operates on the margin because it is the most expensive
form of generation (Sicilia Salvadores and Horst
Keppler 2010; 2012a). In this section, we describe
how LEERA calculates the long-run marginal cost
(LRMC) of generation and the marginal tariff at which
savings occur for each appliance in Mexico.
TVs and refrigerators have almost 100 % residential
penetration rates (Davis et al. 2012; Komives et al. 2009).
Hence, the LEERA model calculates marginal tariffs of
households that own these two appliances by taking the
average, seasonally adjusted customer electricity con-
sumption for each residential tariff zone and applying the
tariff rate at that consumption level (CFE 2012a). These
marginal tariffs for each zone are then weighted by the
zone’s proportion of all customers (CFE 2012b) to get a
nationally representative marginal tariff at which savings
from more efficient refrigerators and TVs will occur.
LEERA calculates the marginal tariff for room ACs
differently because they are only present in 39 % of
households and their use is greater in hotter regions
where consumers are subsidized more heavily. From
SEAD UEC data (Shah et al. 2013) and IEA data on
Mexican household share of AC energy consumption
(Ellis 2009), LEERA calculates the minimum energy
consumption of an AC-owning household. The model
then uses this consumption level to determine which
households in each tariff zone have ACs and their cor-
responding marginal tariff. A nationally representative
ACmarginal tariff is determined by taking an average of
the marginal AC tariffs in each zone weighted by the
number of AC-owning households in each zone. For
more details on the calculation of AC marginal tariffs,
please refer to the Electronic supplementary material.
Given fuel oil’s significant share of the generation mix
(18 %), a 64 % capacity factor (IEA 2012), and because
fuel oil generators almost always operate on the margin
due to their high costs, it is sound to assume that these
plants will be the marginal generators for efficiency
savings. Even if the incentive programs we propose in
this paper are extremely successful, they are unlikely to
reduce total Mexican electricity demand by 18 %, which
is the level necessary to completely avoid the need for
fuel oil generators. Hence, it would be sufficient to just
include the cost of fuel oil generation when calculating
the LRMC in LEERA. However, because the share of
fuel oil generation is expected to gradually drop over the
coming two decades (Komives et al. 2009; 2012b), we
make the conservative assumption that 10 % of the long-
run margin will be from substantially cheaper natural gas
generation. This assumption reduces the revenues from
avoided subsidy payments calculated by LEERA and
therefore reduces the self-financing efficiency potential
in our results.
To calculate the cost of fuel oil generation, LEERA
uses its opportunity cost: the international market price.
This is necessary because the prices charged for fuel oil
by the state-owned oil company Pemex to the state-
owned utility CFE are not public. In any case, it is very
likely that Pemex would sell any fuel oil not needed for
power generation at market price, probably to interna-
tional shipping companies that use Mexican ports. Since
Pemex is state-owned, this fuel oil sale revenue that
results directly from improved appliance efficiency will
accrue to the government. We use the 2012–2022 aver-
age of the reference forecast fuel oil price from the
Annual Energy Outlook 2013 to calculate the long-run
variable cost of generation (AEO 2013). Based on power
plant efficiencies, this translates to a variable generation
cost of approximately US$0.22 per kWh (Badcock and
Lenzen 2010; Honorio 2003; Lewis 2012). We correct
this generation cost for transmission and distribution
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losses, approximately 17 % in Mexico (2012b), to cal-
culate the LRMC of end-use delivered fuel oil electricity.
The same procedure is used to calculate the LRMC of
natural gas generation where we again use the Annual
Energy Outlook 2013 reference forecast of natural gas
prices for electricity generation (2013). Assuming a gen-
erous power plant efficiency of 49 % (Honorio 2003;
Sicilia Salvadores and Horst Keppler 2010), this trans-
lates to a variable natural gas generation cost of US$0.04
per kWh after adjusting for transmission losses. Since
fossil fuel prices tend to be volatile, we analyze the
sensitivity of our final results to oil and natural gas prices
by including calculations for low and high EIA price
scenarios. Finally, we do not include any fixed costs in
our LRMC calculation. If we were to include the fixed
costs, which are typically more than double the variable
costs for marginal generators, we would find greater
incentive self-financing potential in our final results.
For readers interested in more detail, please refer to
the Electronic supplementary material where we have
provided the entire LEERAMexico analysis and data in
spreadsheet form.
Results
We find that efficiency-induced savings in subsidy pay-
ments could finance incentives that cover the entire in-
cremental manufacturing cost of refrigerators that are
29 % more efficient than baseline models. In the case of
LED-LCD TVs, the full incremental cost of models that
are 36 % more efficient than baseline models could be
financed with just half of the savings from avoided sub-
sidy payments. For room ACs, revenue from avoided
subsidies could finance an incentive that would cover
about one third of the incremental manufacturing cost of
a 10 % efficiency improvement (see Figs. 3, 4, and 5). Of
all the principal input parameters in this analysis, we find
that forecasts of oil and natural gas prices are the main
parameters with uncertainty levels high enough to signif-
icantly change our results. Hence, we assess the sensitiv-
ity of our results for each appliance and find that our main
conclusions are qualitatively robust (see Figs. 6, 7, and 8).
We discuss our findings for each appliance below.
Refrigerators
The substantial market transformation potential we find
for Mexican refrigerators is due to three main reasons:
the large subsidies on each unit of refrigerator energy
consumption, relatively high annual UEC, and the long
life of the appliance. First, because refrigerators are
owned by most households, rich or poor in all tariff
zones, energy savings frommore efficient models occur,
on average, at highly subsidized tariff rates, thereby
yielding more monetary savings to the government.
Second, the UEC for refrigerators is high with no direct
rebound. This is because refrigerators are always
plugged in and are in continuous operation. Thus, any
increase in efficiency translates to substantial annual
energy savings. Finally, refrigerators have long lifetimes
(15 years), so the large annual monetary and energy
savings continue over a long time period. For these
reasons, we find that efficiency-induced subsidy savings
can yield revenue equal to the incremental manufactur-
ing cost of refrigerator models that are 29 % more
efficient than baseline models (see Fig. 3). Figure 3 also
shows that if an upstream incentive program was imple-
mented that covered the full incremental cost difference
for every model up to 29%more efficient than baseline,
the total income from subsidy savings would actually be
greater than the expenditures on incentives. This net
positive revenue could be used to cover other costs
(administrative, management, etc.) of implementing
the program.
LED-LCD televisions
Currently, LED-LCD TVs have low market penetration
in Mexico but are expected to constitute nearly 95 % of
the national stock within a decade (Park et al. 2011).
Almost all new purchases today are LED-LCD models
(Park et al. 2011). Therefore, in our analysis, we choose
an already efficient LED-LCD TVas our baseline mod-
el. Further, TV UEC is substantially lower than refrig-
erators yielding less annual revenue potential from sub-
sidy savings. We still find the market transformation
potential for TVs to be greater than refrigerators for
two reasons. First, two technologies, Dual Brightness
Enhancement Film (DBEF) and Local Dimming, sub-
stantially increase LED-LCD TV efficiency at low
costs3 (Park et al. 2011). Second, TV energy savings
also occur at the same highly subsidized tariff rates as
3 For more information on DBEF and Local Dimming technolo-
gies, please refer to the SEAD TVAnalysis that can be found here:
http://www.superefficient.org/Activities/Technical%20Analysis/
SEAD%20TV%20Analysis.aspx
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refrigerators since both appliances are similarly distrib-
uted among households. Figure 4 shows that TV
efficiency-induced subsidy savings can yield revenue
that is substantially greater than the incremental
manufacturing cost of all super-efficient LED-LCD
TV models. Note that we would see even greater poten-
tial if we set the baseline TV model to reflect today’s
market average efficiency in Mexico. Such a baseline
would be appropriate to support the design of an early
replacement incentive program. In this case, however,
we choose to show a result that can support the design of
an upstream program targeting only new purchases.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that further
increases in TV efficiency involve a fundamental tech-
nological shift (i.e., OLED TVs) (Park et al. 2011), and
hence, we should not assume that the two curves we see
in Fig. 4 will continue to diverge at higher efficiency
improvements, as the costs of OLED TVs are very
uncertain at this time (Park et al. 2011).
Room ACs
Room ACs differ from TVs and refrigerators in two
ways that reduce their market transformation potential
in this analysis. First, improved AC efficiency yields
less than half the savings from avoided subsidy pay-
ments when compared to TVs and refrigerators. This is
because AC savings occur, on average, at less subsi-
dized tariff rates. Second, studies have shown that AC
efficiency improvements result in larger rebound, espe-
cially for households in hot regions, although the effect
is weaker in wealthier households (Davis et al. 2012).
So, we use a rebound value for ACs of 24 % (13 %
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Fig. 3 Revenue potential from
































Appliance Model Energy Efficiency Improvement Over Baseline
Revenues from avoided subsidy payments Incremental Manufacturing Cost
Fig. 4 Revenue potential from
avoided subsidy payments and
incremental manufacturing costs
for TVs
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that account for these effects (Maxwell et al. 2011;
Nadel 2012). Therefore, even with high baseline con-
sumption and a relatively long life (582 kWh per year,
12 years), Fig. 5 shows that AC efficiency-induced
savings in subsidy payments do not yield enough reve-
nue to cover the entire incremental manufacturing cost
of more efficient roomACmodels. However, Fig. 5 also
shows that avoided subsidy revenue would be sufficient
to contribute one third of the incremental manufacturing
cost of a model that is 10 % more efficient than the
baseline. Note that AC use is a much greater contributor
to daily peak demand than refrigerators or TVs. Hence,
inefficient ACs cost CFE, and therefore, the government
a lot more than just electricity consumption subsidies in
the long run. Therefore, the long-run savings that result
from better power system planning due to improved AC



































Appliance Model Energy Efficiency Improvement Over Baseline
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Fig. 5 Revenue potential from
avoided subsidy payments and
incremental manufacturing costs
for room air conditioners
Fig. 6 Revenue potential sensitivity analysis for refrigerators
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Sensitivity analysis: model input parameters
and uncertainty
As with any model, LEERA includes assumptions and
choices, both parametric and epistemic, the most
important of which we explain and justify in the earlier
section describing the model. However, it is important to
assess the sensitivity of our main findings to uncer-
tainties in key input variables to see if our conclusions
could be fundamentally different. In order to decide
Fig. 7 Revenue potential sensitivity analysis for TVs
Fig. 8 Revenue potential sensitivity analysis for room air conditioners
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where to focus our sensitivity analysis, we compile
a summary of key model input parameters, their
sources, our understanding of uncertainty in each,
and the qualitative effect of changes in each param-
eter on the market transformation potential of in-
centives financed by efficiency-induced subsidy
savings (shown in Table 1).
LEERA’s input parameters can be separated into one
of three categories based on the parts of the analysis that
each parameter influences. The three categories are the
following:
1. Electricity generation and supply cost calculation
2. Calculation of tariffs at which efficiency savings
occur for each appliance
3. Costs, use, and behavior related to each appliance
In the first category, the variables with the highest
uncertainty are the price forecasts for fuel oil and natural
gas. There are low levels of uncertainty regarding the
long-run marginal fuel mix for reasons that we explain
in the earlier section describing the model. Still, we
choose a conservative value for the fuel mix that dimin-
ishes our revenue estimates so any sensitivity analysis
on this parameter will only further enhance our conclu-
sions. In the second category, there is medium uncer-
tainty in the ratio of summer to winter consumption for a
representative household because this ratio is estimated
based on the difference in IBT consumption thresholds
for each season and not from empirical data (for more
information refer to the Electronic supplementary mate-
rial). In the third category, there is a medium degree of
uncertainty in the magnitude of the rebound effect, but
because we use a value close to the highest estimates of
rebound from the literature, sensitivity analyses on this
parameter will only show greater efficiency improve-
ment potential. All the other parameters have low to
negligible uncertainty. Hence, from Table 1, we con-
clude that uncertainties in fuel oil and natural gas price
forecasts are the most likely to qualitatively change our
conclusions.When we apply LEERA to other countries,
we expect fossil fuel price forecasts to be the most
uncertain parameters in those cases as well.
We run our analysis for the low and high EIA price
scenarios for fuel oil and natural gas to assess the sen-
sitivity of our results to these price forecasts (2013).
Figures 6, 7, and 8 show that our main findings for each
appliance are qualitatively robust. Recall from the sec-
tion describing the model that our choices on what to
exclude when calculating subsidy levels and the long-
run marginal supply cost, the high values we use for
rebound and the share of natural gas on the margin all
reduce self-financing potential for efficiency incentives
further underlining the significance and robustness of
our findings. Even if prices of fuel oil and natural gas
remain low over the next decade, we still see substantial
revenue-neutral market transformation potential for TVs
and refrigerators. Conversely, if the high price projec-
tions come to pass, we see 15 % revenue neutral
efficiency improvement potential for room ACs
and greater than 36 % improvement potential for
refrigerators and TVs.
Figure 6 shows that efficiency-induced subsidy sav-
ings can still yield revenue equal to the incremental
manufacturing cost of refrigerator models that are
20 % more efficient than baseline models even if fuel
oil and natural gas follow the EIA low price scenario. If
these commodities follow the high price scenario,
efficiency-induced subsidy savings will yield enough
revenue to finance incentives for models that are 36 %
more efficient than baseline. Hence, we find that the
case for a self-financed refrigerator incentive program in
Mexico is strong and robust.
Figure 7 shows that our results for TVs are evenmore
robust than for refrigerators. In all fuel oil and natural
gas price scenarios, the efficiency-induced subsidy sav-
ings are greater than the full incremental cost of an LED-
LCD TV that is 36 % more efficient than baseline.
Hence, our analysis makes a strong, robust case that a
TV incentive program can be largely self-financed by
the efficiency-induced subsidy savings in Mexico
Figure 8 shows that if the EIA’s low price scenario for
fuel oil and natural gas materializes, it could completely
eliminate the Mexican government’s subsidy burden at
the tariff rate where savings fromACs occur. Hence, AC
energy savings will not yield revenue from savings in
subsidy payments. However, if the high price scenario
occurs, we find that subsidy savings revenue would
almost equal the incremental cost of a model 15 % more
efficient than baseline. When this revenue is coupled
with the other benefits from AC efficiency improve-
ments that we discuss in the AC result subsection,
the Mexican government could finance an AC
incentive program that can lead to significant mar-
ket transformation. In summary, our conclusion
that the self-financing potential for AC incentives
in Mexico is small and significantly lower than for
TVs and refrigerators is robust.
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Discussion
The LEERA model can support financial incentive pro-
gram implementation in a number of ways. It can show
how much, if any, appliance efficiency improvements
can be achieved through financing incentives with
avoided subsidy payments at a zero or positive net cash
flow impact to the government. In turn, this information
can help inform incentive levels and incentive program
design. For example, LEERA can calculate the appli-
ance efficiency improvement potential from self-
financing for upstream, midstream, or downstream
programs. If program administrative costs are
known, it can estimate the efficiency improvement
potential and the share of self-financing that will
go toward these costs. We also plan to extend
LEERA to quantify the efficiency-induced incen-
tive financing potential from avoided additions to
generation capacity and reduced pollution from the
energy system. Importantly, we can apply the
model to quantify such self-financing potential
for energy efficiency within the business models
of privately owned utilities that are common in the
USA and Europe.
LEERA could also be used to support standards and
labeling programs. For example, LEERA’s calculation
of efficiency-induced subsidy savings can be added to
other consumer cost effectiveness metrics to calculate
the national cost effectiveness of strengthening MEPS.
Where standards are in place, LEERA can be used to
compare existing MEPS with higher efficiency levels
that could be obtained at zero net cash flow impact to the
government.
Finally, this model allows policymakers to com-
pare and contrast the savings, both energy and
financial, and the drivers of those savings, for
different end uses. In countries that subsidize res-
idential electricity—those contemplating implemen-
tation of financial incentive programs as well as
those with programs in place—LEERA can be
used to help policymakers implement and improve
financial incentive programs. We plan several im-
provements to LEERA: developing the ability to
analyze the impacts and implications of peak con-
sumption and cross subsidization and linking
LEERA with LBNL’s Bot tom Up Energy
Analysis System (BUENAS) (McNeil et al. 2013)
to estimate macro impacts of using avoided subsi-
dies to finance incentives.
Conclusion
Many countries around the world, including a number
of emerging economies, subsidize electricity consump-
tion, which promotes increased and inefficient energy
consumption. Countries that subsidize electricity often
find it politically difficult to lower or eliminate subsidies
and are frequently unable to strengthen MEPS for eco-
nomic and political reasons. In this environment, gov-
ernments have an opportunity to use efficiency-induced
savings in subsidy payments to self-finance appliance
incentive programs that improve end-use energy effi-
ciency. The LEERA model supports the design of such
incentive programs down to the level of specific appli-
ance models.
In the case of Mexico, we find that savings from
avoided subsidy payments can finance incentives that
cover the entire incremental manufacturing cost of re-
frigerators that are 29 % more efficient than baseline
models. In the case of LED-LCD TVs, the full incre-
mental cost of models that are 36 % more efficient than
baseline LED-LCDTVs could be financedwith just half
of the savings from avoided subsidies. For room ACs,
revenue from avoided subsidies could finance an incen-
tive that would cover about one third of the incremental
manufacturing cost of a 10 % efficiency improvement.
We assess the sensitivity of our results to key parameters
and find the results for all three appliances to be robust.
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